This paper describes interactions between agents who sometimes choose as individuals and sometimes as members of teams. Choosing as a member of a team entails not only being motivated by the team's objective, but also a distinctive pattern of reasoning: an agent who 'team reasons' computes, and chooses her component in, a pro…le evaluated using the team's objective function. It is not assumed that a given agent team reasons for a particular team; there may be more than one team, and which she reasons for is here treated probabilistically. Ordinary reasoning is a special case in which the team is a singleton. The framework therefore encompasses interactions paradigmatic in the theory of cooperative behaviour in which agents may choose either for the group or for themselves. The hypothesis that people may team reason if and when they are group motivated can, it is shown, explain some puzzling aspects of cooperative behaviour in a new way.
INTRODUCTION
This paper describes interactions between agents who may act not as ordinary individuals, but as members of teams. Acting as a member of a team entails being guided by the team's objective. But in addition to this it involves a distinctive way of reasoning to a choice, which I shall call 'team reasoning'. Team reasoning has a di¤erent logical form from other more familiar kinds of reasoning. Informally, when each member of a group works out what to do by putting herself in the position of an imaginary manager and determining the action which the manager would prescribe for her, she 'team reasons'. Team-reasoning is powerful: it reaches outcomes that other kinds of reasoning cannot reach. A second aim of the present paper is to explain certain kinds of badly-understood cooperative behaviour. The empirical hypothesis that people team reason is shown to be capable of explaining cooperation in a variety of settings.
Team reasoning can occur in game-like contexts in which interdependent agents must make choices. The description I give here of such choices di¤ers from that given in standard game theory, since individual agents may team reason. Moreover, for generality, and for realism, the model does not simply assume that a given agent team reasons for a certain team. There may be several teams -each typically a subset of the set of agents -and whether a given individual acts as a member of one or another, or for herself, is treated probabilistically. Solidarity may be imperfect and allegiance …ckle.
Ordinary individual reasoning can be subsumed under the notion of team reasoning, for it can be treated as a special case in which the team consists of a single agent. Thus the framework encompasses a class of interactions that is paradigmatic in the theory of cooperative behaviour, in which individuals may either act for themselves or be motivated by the group interest. But their choices in the latter case turn out not to be the same in general as the choices of group-motivated individuals as usually modelled, since acting as a member of a team involves not only having the group's objective but also team reasoning.
Typically, the best thing to do in acting for a team depends on who else is active in it. It follows that sound reasoning for a team must take account of comembers' unreliability. That is, good team reasoning must be 'circumspect'. In simple cases, it is clear enough what lapsing members will do: there is a well-de…ned default choice. For example, we can assume that in a Prisoner's Dilemma a lapsing member of the team consisting of the two players chooses Defect. More generally, lapsing members may optimize their actions against hypotheses about the behaviour of the rump of the team. This means that sound team reasoning is not only circumspect but also game-theoretical. I shall spell out the essential game-theoretical aspects of team reasoning in the notion of an unreliable team interaction.
In an important essay Sugden (1993) describes and defends as rational a way of reasoning in games which is essentially team reasoning under common knowledge of solidarity. The present paper departs from Sugden, and from other discussions of reasoning to collective choices (Gilbert 1989 , Tuomela 1995 , in providing a model which is formal, rather general, and treats team reasoning as circumspect and strategic.
The general model of unreliable team interactions covers a wide range of human decision-making. Ordinary games between individual players are a special case. Another is 'elementary' unreliable team interactions in which each of N agents either acts for the team of all N, or lapses and plays for the singleton team consisting of herself. We shall see that the general model encompasses everyday decision problems which can be described only with awkwardness, and in some cases not at all, in the standard, individualistic, framework. These include interactions between …rms, social groups, combattant units or sports teams, and problems of self-control akin to those discussed by Strotz (1955-6) , Ainslie (1992) and others, which may be treated as unreliable team interactions in which the agents are the dated subpersons and the team is the person.
A variety of mechanisms may cause agents to team reason. In some cases, such as military units, prison gangs and some ordinary workforces, it is natural to expect agents unre ‡ectingly to acquiesce in carrying out uncongenial orders. If they are told to coordinate their actions to achieve a given goal, but the appropriate individual actions are left to the agents to …gure out, acting on orders is team reasoning. These are cases of coerced agency. In other cases, it is more natural to think of agents not as coerced but as choosing to team reason because doing so is an optimal strategy in some embedding game. In yet other cases, team reasoning can arise as the spontaneous behaviour of agents who somehow or other come to 'identify themselves' with a group. In this paper I shall employ unreliable team interactions to model formally some mechanisms involving group identi…ca-tion and issuing in cooperation which have been postulated by the research groups of Dawes and of Brewer (Dawes et al 1988, Kramer and Brewer 1984) .
The next section presents the formal model of team reasoning, unreliable teams and unreliable team interactions. Section 3 presents an example. Section 4 considers the possibility of reformulating unreliable team interactions as games. It is shown that an unreliable team interaction is not in general outcome-equivalent to a game of incomplete information between individuals with variable objective functions, but is outcome-equivalent to a game of incomplete information with one player for each team. Section 5 describes group identi…cation and discusses how group identity is related to team reasoning. Section 6 establishes conditions under which team reasoning yields cooperation in two types of cooperation problem: a Prisoner's Dilemma in which players have (asymmetric) information about each other's participation, and a public good contribution problem in which one or more subsets of contributors may group identify. Section 7 discusses some loose ends.
UNRELIABLE TEAM INTERACTIONS

Elements of the Theory
In this section I present the theory of unreliable team interactions. It has three main elements: the de…nition of team reasoning, the assumption that individual members of teams are unreliable participants, and the structure of the information members have about others' participation.
Consider a set M of agents labelled 1; ¢ ¢ ¢ ; m, and suppose that each agent i can choose an act from a set A i . Write a for the pro…le of acts (a i ) (a i 2 A i ; i 2 M), and let U be a real-valued function on pro…les a. We shall interpret U as a utility function for the team whose members are M (thus in its intended interpretation our theory takes the line that collections of people can have objectives). I shall say that agent i team reasons (for M) when she …rst computes a best pro…le a ¤ (in terms of U), next computes a ¤ i , and lastly decides to do a ¤ i because this is the component under her control of a best pro…le. We can capture the essence of team reasoning in the following schema for practical inference:
where B is a set of background premisses, ¤ M symbolizes 'M ought to', and ¤ i symbolizes 'i ought to'.
I leave aside for now the question of when, if ever, it can be rational for an agent to reach a decision by team reasoning. But, from the de…nition, it is clearly good for M if all its members team reason. Provided a ¤ is unique, this remains true even when no agent can observe any other agent's decision, for (under uniqueness) team reasoning by all ensures coordination success. But then also, if it happens that U is Paretian -that is, U(a) > U(a 0 ) whenever a strictly Pareto-dominates a 0 -then it is good for everyone in M if everyone in M team reasons.
If each agent in M knows that all the others are also team reasoning, then in seeking a best pro…le each solves the same optimization problem. This remains true if we enrich the above set-up by supposing that the e¤ect of a on U is mediated by a state µ of the environment, and that di¤erent agents receive di¤erent signals s i , where s i is a function of µ. The optimization problem that each agent now has to solve is to determine an optimal team decision-function ® ¤ , consisting of m agent decision-functions ® ¤ i de…ned on the agents' respective signals. A team-thinking agent i solves this problem, then chooses the act ® ¤ i (s i ). This optimization problem is a central topic in the theory of teams (Marschak and Radner 1972) and the theory of multi-agent systems (Fagin et al 1995). The interpretation of the optimization di¤ers, however, in the three theories: in the theory of teams, we imagine some 'organizer' who works out ® ¤ , then somehow contrives that agent i chooses according to ® ¤ i ; so there is a principal-agent problem which must either be left dangling, or factored into the optimization problem. In the case of multi-agent systems, and in the team reasoning scenario, there is no such problem: in the former case we think of the 'agents' as computer programmes designed by an optimizing analyst, and in the latter it is simply assumed that each agent team reasons.
We can imagine a situation in which K disjoint teams interact, and there is common knowledge that every agent team reasons for her team. Intuitively, this problem is a K-player game with the gloss that each player's chosen act is an ordered tuple, decentrally implemented by the mechanism of team reasoning.
The real divergence from the theory of teams begins with the second element of the model, the assumption that participation is unreliable -that an agent i in M may or may not team reason for M. We can think of i as being of one of two types in the sense of incomplete information game theory: participating, in which case she team reasons for M, or lapsing. But, since 'type' may misleadingly suggest a permanent trait, I shall speak not of i's 'type' but of her 'state'.
It is natural to assume introspective knowledge of one's own deliberations, and so that an agent's signal includes her participation state. On the other hand, there is no reason in general why agents should know other members' states. One can imagine both kinds of case. If a task-force physically meets to accomplish a joint objective, it is often obvious who is and who is not contributing. But the soldiers of a platoon …ghting in the jungle may know nothing about how many of their fellow-members have been wounded or have deserted. There are intermediate cases too: when four people put their shoulders to a car each has some, but less than conclusive, evidence about who is playing his part. The description of how much members know about who is in the participating state is the third element of the model. I shall use a general formulation: each agent, before choosing an act, receives a signal, knowing the joint probability distribution of this signal and agents' states.
Unreliable Teams Interactions
A function from agent i's signals to her acts will be called a 'protocol for i', and an m-tuple of such functions, one for each i in M, a 'protocol for M'. [1] The …rst (and the only cognitively demanding) task for a team reasoner is to determine an optimal protocol for M. Since her team is unreliable, to do this she needs to know what other members do if they lapse. In the general case, an agent who lapses from M may be an active member of some other team. Hence what active members of di¤erent teams do is essentially interdependent and underdetermined, like the optimal choices of players in ordinary games; all one can do is to characterize equilibria.
We consider a set of agents 1; ¢ ¢ ¢ ; N, and K teams M 1 ; ¢ ¢ ¢ ; M K , each of which consists of a subset of the N agents. Each agent i is a member of one or more teams, but it is assumed that on any given occasion she is active in exactly one. There is no loss of generality in assuming that she is active in at least one, since fig may be treated formally as a one-person team. The assumption that i is active in at most one, however, excludes some real phenomena, notably cases in which an agent is not only inclined to participate in more than one team but is simultaneously inclined to. The present assumption steers us clear of the di¢cult issues raised by such cases, but some of the apparatus I present here is adaptable to them (Bacharach 1997) .
Agent i receives a two-component signal z i = (s i ; t i ): the …rst component, s i , i's 'outside signal', is interpreted as some observation of the environment; the second component, t i , i's 'participation state', speci…es in which team i is active. The N-tuple of signals (z 1 ; ¢ ¢ ¢ ; z N ) is assumed to be governed by an objective joint probability distribution -. This means that in the present model an agent '…nds herself' participating in a certain team: her participation is not a choice, nor otherwise endogenized. I shall discuss how participation probabilities might be endogenized in section 7.
Finally, each agent i is able to perform any act in a set A i .
An 'unreliable team interaction' is de…ned relatively to a structure hM; A; U; S; T; -i, where M = fM 1 ; ¢ ¢ ¢ ; M K g, and for k = 1; ¢ ¢ ¢ ; K, M k µ f1; ¢ ¢ ¢ ; Ng, the set of agents , -is a probability measure on S £ T .
M k is called an unreliable team. A uti with the team structure M = ff1g; ¢ ¢ ¢ ; fNgg is easily seen to be an ordinary game, more precisely an ordinary N-player strategic-form incomplete-information game. A uti is called elementary if it has the team structure M = ff1g; ¢ ¢ ¢ ; fNg; f1; ¢ ¢ ¢ ; Ngg. Elementary uti's arise in the analysis, later on, of N-person collective action problems.
An agent protocol for i is a function from her outside signal set S i to her act set A i . A protocol for M k is an ordered tuple of agent protocols, one for each of its members.
Our interpretation of t i = k, namely that agent i is active in M k and lapses from each other team of which she is a member, is captured in the assumption that, if t i = k, i follows the agent protocol for i speci…ed in the protocol for M k . Let the protocol for M k be ® k = (® k i ) (i 2 M k ). Then our assumption is:
An unreliable team interaction is de…ned to be a structure hM; A; U; S; T; -i together with protocols ® k for the M k (k = 1; ¢ ¢ ¢ ; K) which satisfy (01). Remarks 1. The information structure of an unreliable team interaction is expressed in -. A simple and important case is that of an incomunicado team, like a jungle platoon, in which the ith member's signal tells her nothing about the states of members unless her own state does so; that is, -(t j j z i ) = -(t j j t i ) for j 6 = i. A special case is a blind team, in which i observes nothing except her own state, that is:
In this case, a protocol simply speci…es an act for each member. I note that even in a blind team, an agent may learn something about others' likely states, for the t i need not be independent.
2.
It is only what an agent's signal tells her about others' states that matters; and it does matter. In the Radner-Marschak team model, z i is evidence about a general environmental state µ which a¤ects the payo¤ from a. In my model, for simplicity, U is a function only of a. But the payo¤ from the protocol ® is crucially a¤ected by the participation state vector t, through (01).
3. The de…nition of a uti allows us to express the basic Radner-Marschak problem, that of a team 'against nature', generalized, if we wish, to allow for unreliability. If participation is sure, the problem is simply a uti with K = 1 and -(t i = 1) = 1 for i = 1; ¢ ¢ ¢ ; N. As an example of the uncertain participation case, consider the designing of a multi-agent system whose components are liable to failure. We may model this case as an elementary uti in which, for each agent i, A i contains the default act d i interpreted as 'i fails' and for each singleton team fig, d i is strictly dominant. It now follows that a protocol for M 1 solves the designer's problem if and only if it is an 'equilibrium' protocol as we shall de…ne this term.
It is convenient to express the payo¤ of team M k as a function of ® and the N-tuples of outside signals and participation states, (s 1 ; ¢ ¢ ¢ ; s N ) and (t 1 ; ¢ ¢ ¢ ; t N ). From (act), we have for this payo¤
Equilibria
Intuitively, an equilibrium of a uti is a pro…le of K team protocols each of which is optimal for its team given all the others. This suggests that it may be possible to represent a uti equilibrium as an equilibrium of a game between K teams, and indeed I shall presently give such a representation. For the moment, I merely de…ne an equilibrium formally. For simplicity of exposition assume that S, and so Z, is …nite. Then if the K-tuple of team protocols is ®, from (02) the expected value of M k 's payo¤ may be written as follows, as a function of ® alone:
say. We de…ne® to be an equilibrium of the uti hM; A; U; S; T; -i i¤
When we come to discuss how uti's are related to Bayesian games in the next section, we shall need the following property of uti equilibria.
Lemma 1.
If® is an equilibrium of the uti I = hM; A; U; S; T; -i then, for each k, and each i in M k ,® k i maximizes EU k subject to the conditions that t i = k and that each j 6 = i follows®.
The ith arguments of the U k terms in V k (®) are all of the form ® k i (s i ) (for various s i values) in the …rst sum, and all of the form ® l i (s i ), l 6 = k, in the second. Hence the maximizing ® k i must maximize the …rst sum in
, and so to
, since terms of the form ® l i with l 6 = k do not appear in the …rst sum. Thuŝ
Call a game with a pro…le that weakly Pareto-improves on all Nash equilibria one of 'weak common interest'. Such games o¤er 'scope for cooperation' in that players could enjoy an outcome weakly Pareto-better than any that is achievable by non-cooperative play. A broad class of 2-person weak common interest games have the following payo¤ matrix with parameter (x; y). We know only too well what are the prospects for subjects of game theory to realize the scope for cooperation in such games. Even in Rousseau's Stag Hunt we have no good theoretical reason to expect decision makers who reason game-theoretically to play H rather than L. Let us use the model of uti's to ask how decision makers will fare who, for one reason or another, team reason for the group. This question is underde…ned until a group objective is speci…ed. But it is implicit in the question just raised that we should take this to be Paretian in the individual functions. The team structure of the player set is also implicit: since we are interested in the pull of individualist against team forces, we should model the situation as an elementary uti. [2] Assume that each player i team reasons for f1; 2g with probability !, and with probability 1 ¡ ! lapses from f1; 2g and plays for herself. Take the group utility to be the mean of individual payo¤s. The interesting case is that in which
as otherwise H dominates L for the group. (03) holds in all of our three games. The situation is the elementary uti I 1 (x; y) = hM; A; U(x; y), S; T; -i with
S i = ;; T 1 = f1; 3g, T 2 = f2; 3g;
and -(t 1 ; t 2 ) given by
This is a blind uti: i's signal tells her her own state and nothing else. Thus a protocol for a team M k is simply a string of acts in fH, Lg, one for each member. Let us write a for the protocol (a) (a 2 fH, Lg) of a singleton team and ab for the protocol (a;b) (a;b 2 fH, Lg) of M 3 . De…ne
,
HH) is an equilibrium if and only if
HH is no worse than HL (or LH) just if
This equilibrium is not unique. (H, H, HH) is an equilibrium for all ! as long as x < 3, as in Stag Hunts; this is unsurprising since for such games with only singleton teams (H, H) is a Nash equilibrium. What is new is that HH can be optimal for the group team even when lapsers will choose L, and conversely.
There is an (L, L, HH) equilibrium if ! lies in (0.75, 0.875) in the risky Stag Hunt, and in (0.333, 1) in the PD. In Rouseau's Stag Hunt ! 1 = ! 2 = 0:333 (as soon as ! exceeds 1/3 the best reply for M 1 to (L;HH) is H); what brings ! 2 right down to ! 1 is the low value of x: this tilts the lapser towards H for a given probability ! that her coplayer is solid.
Before going on, let us brie ‡y compare ! 1 with the incidence of cooperative behaviour needed to induce H when the cooperative behaviour is produced in other ways. This is a large topic, since several things can be meant by 'cooperative behaviour' and there is more than one 'way of producing' it. I shall return to it later, in Sections 5 and 7.
When is H an individualistic best reply to a polymorphism? Suppose a population contains fractions´, 1 ¡´of unconditional H players and unconditional L players. Let´1 be the least´against which H is an individualistic best reply. We …nd that, in all our cases, ! 1 6´1. For example,´1 = 0:875 in risky Stag Hunt, and in PD not even´= 1 su¢ces.
This demonstrates the power of team reasoning to produce cooperative behaviour. But the demonstration is crude, since it compares the behaviour of individual reasoners with egoistic payo¤s with that of team reasoners pursuing group utility U. Of greater interest is a like-with-like comparison of team reasoners pursuing U with individual reasoners also pursuing U.
UNRELIABLE INTERACTIONS AS GAMES
UTIs Are Not Games between Benefactors
Consider a team M with payo¤ function U. It might be thought that, even if team reasoning for M di¤ers from individualistic reasoning with M's payo¤ function U, nevertheless the two procedures yield the same outcomes. In this subsection I show that this suggestion is false by showing the inequivalence of the uti I with the corresponding game between N individuals all with payo¤ function U, the 'Harsanyi game generated by I'. We shall …nd that the equilibria of I are a subset of those of the Harsanyi game. In the next subsection I show that, on the other hand, I may be represented by another game: it is outcome-equivalent to a certain K-player game. / Let us call a type of player who reasons individualistically but whose payo¤ function coincides with that of a team M a benefactor of M. Extending the example of the last section, suppose that there are two types of player: benefactors (type B), and individualistic reasoners with egoistic payo¤s (type E). Suppose people are type E or B with probabilities 1 ¡¯;¯. Write (e; b) for the strategy 'play e if type E, b if type B'. In the case of PD, we …nd that the pure equilibria of this incomplete information variant are: (L, L) for all values of¯, and (L, H) if
That is, in equilibrium benefactors play H against L even when they are in a minority as small as 1=6, while we have seen that team reasoners require at least 1=3 of the population to be like themselves for them to choose HH against L. Thus there is a zone (1=6 <¯< 1=3) in which individualistic reasoning produces more cooperation (in the simple sense of H play) than team reasoning. However, this behaviour is objectively ine¢cient in terms of U: for¯in this range, expected U in the (L, H) equilibrium is lower than it is in the (L, L, LL) equilibrium of the uti for the same value of !. The underlying reason is that in general best-replying in terms of U need not produce the maximum feasible value of U. In the present case, it is not optimal for the group that player 2 should play H; but given that he will do so, it is best for the group that player 1 should play H.
More generally: optimal decision rules provide Nash equilibria for benefactors, but not all Nash equilibria for benefactors de…ne optimal team decision rules. This is the content of the next theorem.
Generalizing the last example, let us associate with the arbitrary uti I a Bayesian game between N individual reasoners. This game di¤ers from I in only one respect: the state of agent i in which she is active in M k is replaced by a state in which she is a benefactor of M k .
The Harsanyi game generated by I is the Bayesian game H I = hM; A; U; S; T; -i de…ned by:
In the context of H I we will call (s i ; t i ) the type of agent i. As usual, a strategy for i is a function from her type set Z i = S i £ T i to her act set A i ; and a Bayesian equilibrium of H I is an N-tuple3 = (3 1 ; ¢ ¢ ¢ ;3 N ) of strategies such that3 i maximizes the expected payo¤ of i (i = 1; ¢ ¢ ¢ ; N) when ¾ ¡i =3 ¡i . Let us say that an M-tuple ® of protocols in I and an N-tuple ¾ of strategies in H I agree if for each (s; t) they yield the same N-tuple of acts, that is, if
If ® and ¾ agree, then the act of an agent who …nds herself a benefactor of M k coincides with that given in M k 's agent protocol for i.
Theorem 2. (i)
For all uti's I, for each equilibrium ® of I there is a Bayesian equilibrium of H I with which ® agrees; (ii) for some uti's I there is a Bayesian equilibrium of H I with which no equilibrium of I agrees.
Proof of (i). The expected payo¤ of agent i at the strategy pro…le ¾ may be written
Hence her expected payo¤ conditionally on3 ¡i is
since, when t i = k, agent i's payo¤ function is u i = U k , and her strategy ¾ i is the function ¾ i restricted to
But by Lemma 1,® k i is a maximizer of EU k (¢ j® ¡i ; t i = k) over A i . Thuŝ ¾ i maximizes Eu i (¾ i j3 ¡i ) if3 agrees with®, and since i was arbitrary, (i) follows. ¤ Proof of (ii). Consider the uti I = I 1 (4; ¡3) described in section 3, and assume that -satis…es 1 6 < ! < 1 3 . The related Bayesian game described in that section in which a player may be either type E or type B is the Harsanyian game H I generated by I since, for i = 1; 2; player i is a benefactor of M i = fig, or of M 3 = f1; 2g, according as she is E or B.
We know that, since ! > 1=6, the strategy pro…le3 is a Bayesian equilibrium, where3 is given bŷ
It su¢ces to show that there is no equilibrium® of I that agrees with3. If ® agrees with3 then
But in this case® is an equilibrium of I only if ! > 1=3, contrary to assumption. ¤
Remark. An even simpler case in which the uti equilibria are a strict subset of the corresponding Bayesian equilibria is the pure coordination game HiLo, the game of Figure 1 with (x; y) = (0; 0). For every ! > 0 the unique uti equilibrium is (H, H, HH), while both (L, L) and (H, H) are symmetric Bayesian equilibrium strategies in the Harsanyi game. In particular, (L, L) is an equilibrium strategy in this game but not of the uti when ! = 1 (i.e. there is common belief that both players are group benefactors). More generally, the uti equilibria re…ne the corresponding benefactor equilibria whenever there is a team M k whose members have better and worse ways of coordinating their actions in terms of U k , each of which forms part of a Bayesian equilibrium. In such cases the uti equilibrium singles out the best of the ways of coordinating. Sometimes, but not always, uti equilibrium behaviour is Bayesian equilibrium benefactor behaviour subject to the restriction of Payo¤ Dominance. More will be said about this relationship in subsection 5.5.
UTIs As Games between Teams
The reason why a uti with N agents fails to be an N-player game is not that agent i has more than one possible payo¤ function -that simply makes a Harsanyian game which, as we have seen, is not in geneal behaviourally equivalent to the uti. It is rather than an agent who is active in a nonsingleton team does not seek to optimize her own choice. However, intuitively each team optimizes its choice. This suggests that a uti with K teams is a special kind of K-player game. For any uti we can indeed specify a K-player game which contains some of the structure of the uti and has the same outcomes. In it, each of the K players chooses a protocol ® k . Chance then moves, choosing a total signal vector z = (z 1 ; ¢ ¢ ¢ ; z N ) which for each i has t i = k for precisely one k. This …xes payo¤s: the payo¤ to player k is U k (a) where a i = ® k i (s i ) if t i = k. Formally, we can associate with an arbitrary uti I = hM; A; U,S; -i a strategic form game G I , as follows.
The associated game of the uti I = hM; A; U,S; -i is the strategic form game
is a K-tuple of payo¤ functions V k : § 7 ! R; and §, V are de…ned as follows. § k is the set of protocols for M k in I. And, if ¾ 2 § is a K-tuple
The associated game G I is a representation of the uti I in the limited sense that the map from protocol pro…les to payo¤ pro…les in I is the same as that from the corresponding strategy pro…les to the corresponding payo¤ pro…les in G I . However, G I is a more abstract representation, which makes no mention of individual agents. In particular, it is not a Harsanyian game of incomplete information between the agents 1; ¢ ¢ ¢ ; N. It is also open to interpretations in which the z i are not signals received by N individuals, but N outcomes of an unspeci…ed random experiment, each an ordered pair (s i ; t i ). All that is required for the causal structure of G I to be implemented is some mechanism or other in which, if the realized value of z i has t i = k, the strategy pro…le ® produces the output ® k i (s i ). It is also of interest to consider the interpretation of the 'players' M 1 ; ¢ ¢ ¢ ; M K in G I . They might be perfectly ordinary players, for example managers who leave instructions to members of workteams who are obedient if they turn up for work but may not. On the other hand, in the interpretation of I that motivates this paper (which I shall develop in the next section) group identi…cation generates team reasoning in individual agents' heads, and these agents then perform the acts the reasoning delivers. In this story there are no decision making entities which correspond to the teams. Teams have objectives, but they do not think and act. So on this interpretation the 'players' of G I are …ctions, or mere mathematical constructs.
Nevertheless, the game representation of uti's is useful, for it allows us to draw on well-understood properties of games to study uti's. For example, we have: Theorem 3. The pro…le ® of team protocols is an equilibrium of the uti I i¤ ® is a Nash equilibrium of the associated game G I .
Proof. Immediate from (V), (Eq) and the de…nition of Nash equilibrium. ¤ It is easy to extend the de…nition of a uti, and of equilibria of uti's, to allow mixed protocols, and then to generalize Theorem 3 accordingly. This allows one to draw on existence theorems for strategic form games to show the existence of equilibria in a wide class of uti's. However, the admission of mixed protocols puts a severe restriction on the possible interpretations of uti's. In particular, it restricts the application of the interpretation which motivates this paper, in terms of team reasoning generated by group identi…cation. For, in order to implement a mixed protocol, the active agents of a team would have to be able to vary their actions (more generally, their agent protocols) in unison as di¤erent outcomes of a stochastic process are realized. This capability demands that there be a …ne-grained enough, commonly known random process whose outcomes are commonly observed.
TEAM REASONING AND GROUP IDENTIFICA-TION
Scenarios for Team Reasoning
To recap, a person who team reasons chooses thus: she chooses the act (if this is unique) which is her component in the pro…le which is best for the objective of some group. I now turn to the question what, if anything, the formal model of team reasoning and unreliable teams of Section 2 describes. One answer is the optimization of the set of protocols assigned to a network of mechanical 'agents' in order to achieve some desired end, when individual machines are liable to breakdown. Another is cases of coerced or induced agency in which human agents are gathered together by a principal to achieve the principal's goal by coordinated action, and compute and execute their parts because it is impossible not to, or individually rational to. But in this sort of scenario the agents do not in the last analysis team reason, they merely compute the action dictated by team reasoning as an intermediate step in a piece of individual reasoning. I turn now to the hypothesis that human decision makers may spontaneously engage in true team reasoning. This hypothesis has the following structure: in certain circumstances individuals tend to identify themselves with a group; and group identi…cation leads them to team reason.
Group Identi…cation
As background, I remark that it is quite normal to attribute intentional action (and its inputs, beliefs and objectives) to supraindividual entities, such as …rms, teams, gangs, academic departments, political parties and social groups. Thus someone might well represent an interaction she is in with a …rm -say, a disputed insurance claim with Prudential Assurance -as a 2-player game, between herself and the Prudential, rather than an (m + 1)-player one between herself and m Prudential personnel. Just as easily, a Prudential man might. If so, he takes himself to be part of a supraindividual agency. This seems to be the case whenever one asks not "What should I do?" but rather "What should we do?".
Identifying oneself with a group is probably very ancient, according to Moulin (1984) . Durkheim (1893) speculated that, phylogenetically, it preceded individualistic self-identi…cation, and that it arose because humans acted in teams: "L' ¶ etat primitif du groupe est celui d'une foule indi¤erenci ¶ ee d'êtres humaines dont aucun est poussé à se singulariser comme individu puisque l'acquisition et la distribution des biens sont e¤ectuées en commun." [3] Empirical evidence of group-identi…cation is found in the theory of selfidentity or self-categorization in social psychology. [4] According to Brewer et al there are certain sorts of in ‡uence which tend to produce group identi…ca-tion, and group-identity in turn tends to produce certain sorts of judgments and behaviour. Group identity so understood is not directly observed, but it is a perfectly proper theoretical term in a theory which should be judged as a whole by its ability to explain and predict where other theories fail.
Social psychologists have suggested a number of conditions which tend to promote a sense of group identity, including falling within the same natural social boundary (such as all being students, or elderly, or residents of the same town), being subject to some externally caused 'common fate', or having a common interest. These last taken together may help explain why a group of people locked into a game with scope for cooperation might tend to group-identify. They have a common interest in a Pareto-optimal outcome and, usually, they had no hand in choosing the payo¤ matrix. I shall call the tendency of this combination of factors to produce group identi…cation in the player set the common problem mechanism.
It appears that the chances of adopting one identity rather than another are a¤ected by the 'salience' of the di¤erent category boundaries (Kramer and Brewer 1986 ). Brewer and Gardner (1996) produced certain predicted e¤ects of collective thinking merely by getting subjects …rst to perform an editing task in which they were asked to circle all occurrences in a text of 'we', 'us', and 'our'. [5] The e¤ects of group self-identity are various: judgments of similarity with other persons in the group, applying the group's norms in making evaluations, subscribing to the goals of a group, and being motivated to act so as to further those goals. The last two e¤ects are of particular interest to us.
The research programme in social psychology has not sought to spell out the reasoning which ensues in the heads of individuals if and when they group identify. For the most part it is assumed simply that group identi…cation will raise the probability of cooperative choices in social dilemmas and public good contribution problems. We may distinguish two possible processes: in the …rst, group identi…cation makes the agents into benefactors. In the second, it leads them to team reason for the group.
Group Identi…cation and Team Reasoning
I will not try in this paper to demonstrate the superiority of the team reasoning hypothesis, but I shall point out some considerations which favour it. First, group-identity theorists hold that if someone feels a strong group self-identity, then the group's goals become hers. By this is meant not just that she changes her all-things-considered preferences, now preferring outcomes which give the group high payo¤s. There takes place, in Brewer's (1989) words, a "cognitive extension ... of self-interest": the group's goals de…ne her basic preferences.
Secondly, she identi…es herself with the group; her self conception is as a component part of the group. This is re ‡ected in her language. She thinks and speaks of the group not as 'them and me' but as 'us'. If this is so then, when confronted by a decision problem, she asks herself not "what should I do to further the group interest given that the others are likely to make such and such choices?" but rather "what should we do?" But it is hard to construe "what should we do?", when it is not equivalent to the …rst formulation, other than as a question about the selection of a pro…le. This …rst person plural way of formulating her decision problem thus marks the di¤erence between individualistic reasoning on behalf of the group (what benefactors do) and team reasoning.
The second formulation does not of course mean that she has abandoned all discretion and blithely assumes that all of 'us' will ask the same question and conform to the pro…le that all choose -any more than that it makes her oblivious of the e¤ects of outsiders' actions; she can be circumspect.
Team Reasoning as an Explanation of Cooperation
It is clear (and the example of Section 3 illustrates) that in social dilemmas team reasoning tends to produce cooperative choices. More precisely, it tends to do so if the objective function of the plural team is Paretian. Thus if manipulations designed to induce a group identity raises levels of cooperation in social dilemmas, this would be some support for the theory. [6] There is indeed substantial (though not overwhelming) evidence from experimental games that people who are induced to identify with the playergroup are more likely to make cooperative choices. A series of studies (e.g. Dawes et al 1988 , Brewer and Gardner 1996 , Cookson 1997 ) examine the e¤ect of group identity in producing cooperation in social dilemmas: a typical example is Brewer and Kramer (1986) , who …nd that the willingness to restrict personal gain in order to preserve a collective resource (in an n-person continuous Prisoner's Dilemma) depends signi…cantly on the intensity of manipulated identi…cation with the group.
This evidence supports the hypothesis that certain in ‡uences tend to produce a group identity which tends to produce team reasoning. However, it does not by itself discriminate this hypothesis from the group benefactor alternative.
Team Reasoning versus Re…ned Benefaction
There is a clear conceptual distinction between team reasoning for a certain group and reasoning as a benefactor of it. It might nevertheless be thought that the two will have the same practical consequences, that there is nothing that team reasoning can do which benefactor reasoning cannot do. Theorem 2 showed this supposition false. But notwithstanding Theorem 2, such a claim might be put for benefactor reasoning is the latter is re…ned by the principle of Payo¤ Dominance.
Consider again the game of Hi-Lo. The core, decision-theoretic axioms of game theory fail to determine the outcome of Hi-Lo, even though it seems obvious that H is the better choice. [7] There is no dominance, and even if we strengthen the basic axioms enough to imply that some pure Nash equilibrium is chosen, there are two solutions. However, the e¢cient solution (H, H) is selected if we a¤orce the axioms by adding the Payo¤ Dominance principle (Harsanyi and Selten 1988) .
However, this a¤orcement is question begging, since a large part of the best case for Payo¤ Dominance is an appeal to our intuitive response to games like Hi-Lo.
A further di¢culty in invoking Payo¤ Dominance is that in other problems, such as the risky Stag Hunt, it clashes with Risk Dominance, and our intuitions are ambivalent, or lean towards the risk-dominant choice. One merit of the team reasoning model is that it allows us to derive conformity to Payo¤ Dominance from assumptions about tendencies to team reason, and such tendencies appear to be more basic traits of human agents. In Hi-Lo, team-reasoning with ! = 1 gives a resounding HH, and ! 1 = 0:5. That is, even if we suppose per improbabile that individualistic reasoning selects L, moderately con…dent team reasoners choose H.
Last but not least, the correlation of team reasoning with payo¤-dominant equilibrium selection is con…ned to the special case in which U k is Paretian in the u i 's of members of M k . Although the only examples we have exhibited of benefactor equilibria that do not correspond to an uti equilibrium are of this class, the inequivalence surely extends to the non-Paretian case. For the fundamental key to the relative success of team reasoning over group benefactor reasoning is independent of the objective of the group. This key is that team reasoning removes coordination problems within the group. It does so because it is conducted from a hypothetical standpoint (that of a team protocol chooser) which is bound to yield the same conclusion about what all the agents should do given their signals, whichever reasoning agent occupies it. [8] I have argued in this section that team reasoning might be brought into action by group identi…cation; more precisely, that team reasoning is an integral feature of a strong form of group identi…cation which goes beyond being a benefactor. But I have been discussing only factual questions about team reasoning. The question of its rationality I postpone to the …nal section.
TWO APPLICATIONS TO COOPERATION
Applications of the UTI Model
The potential for applying the model of uti's is very wide. One classes of instances are interactions in which the teams are pre-existing multi-personal entities such as …rms, pressure groups, or social groups such as ethnic groups and social classes. In these cases the group's objective is not in general a Paretian function of the utilities of the agents, but might be anything -the …rm's pro…t, its 'mission', the banning of cigarette advertising, or the overthrow of capitalism. In a second kind of application (Bacharach 1998a ) the uti is an elementary uti in which the team is an individual person and its fragments are the 'temporary agents' which make her up. In this application, the problem of the team -that is, the person -is to decide on a plan which is maximally e¤ective in achieving her life-aims or other long-term objectives in the face of her own tendency to lapse and pursue the dictates of the moment. The team is not incomunicado, since the agents are time-ordered and later agents know by memory about states and acts of earlier ones. The framework allows us to generalize Strotz's (1955-6) notion of 'sophisticated' choice in the face of anticipated changes of preference.
A third …eld of application is to team reasoning as an explanation of cooperative choice. Here the supraindividual teams' objectives are Paretian with respect to their own members. The interaction between the agents (modelled as individual reasoners) is a game with scope for cooperation, such as a social dilemma, or a repeated social dilemma, or some sort of steplevel public good contribution problem, or some sort of Stag Hunt. The teams are incomunicado in one-shot instances, but need not be in dynamic versions. The uti is elementary if the only force for group identi…cation is the common problem mechanism; but there is nothing to exclude prior a¢liations which might make for identi…cation with subsets of the player set. In the rest of this section I decribe two interactions with scope for cooperation, one with a non-incomunicado information structure and the other with multiple group-identi…cation.
Prisoner's Dilemma with Partially Communicating Team
Suppose two agents 1 and 2 play a game with PD payo¤s but in which one player, 2, observes a signal before he acts which gives some evidence of the other's state. Write the PD payo¤ matrix as This payo¤ speci…cation adds r > v to the standard one (if r 6 v the team would lose nothing by having 2 play C whatever her signal value, and the problem would be uninteresting).
As in the earlier analysis of PD, we write M 1 = f1g, M 2 = f2g, M 3 = f1; 2g. Agent 1 observes t 1 , and 2 observes both t 2 and an outside signal s 2 2 S 2 = f?; ¦g. Writé
Suppose that ?is some evidence of t 1 = 3 and ¦ some evidence of t 1 = 1, that is:
Assume that with probability ! each agent is active in M 3 and that their states are statistically independent; that is, -(t 1 ; t 2 ) is given by
Formally, there is a uti hM; A; U; S; T; -i in which U 3 is given by U 3 (C;C) = c, U 3 (C;D) = U 3 (D;C) = v, U 3 (D;D) = r for some c; r; v satisfying (04), S 1 = ;, S 2 = f?; ¦g, T 1 = f1; 3g, T 2 = f2; 3g, and -is given by (05) restricted by (06) and (07). The generic protocol for M 3 may be written
, where a 1 speci…es 1's act, and a 2? and a 2¦ specify 2's act according as s 2 = ? or ¦. Suppose that t = (3; 3). Then noting that -(? j t = (1; 1)) = -(? j t 1 = 1) =´1, etc. we have:
the protocol that does best in state t = (3; 3) is (C;CC ). But this protocol will do badly in other states if´0 is sizeable, since it then quite often makes the type-1 error of telling 2 to do C when 1 is lapsing, making M 3 's payo¤ v instead of r. It will also do badly in state (3; 2), since then it will often also give payo¤ v instead of r, so low ! militates against (C;CC). We can evaluate EU 3 (® 3 j t) in the same way for each value of t. Integrating across t, we obtain expressions for EU 3 (® 3 ) for each ® 3 . These are:
From the …rst four equations we …nd that, among protocols of form (C; ¢),
where I have written
for the odds on the participating state, and
for a parameter which expresses the relative riskiness of playing C. [9] From the last four equations we …nd that, among protocols of form (D; ¢), (D;DD) dominates. So to determine the best plan as the parameters´1,
2 , the team's equilibrium protocol is (C; CC), (C;CD) or (D;DD) according as
2 then the protocol (C;CC) or (D;DD) is optimal according as
The omitted details of the proof are in the Appendix. Which protocol is best depends on three factors: the reliability !, the relative risk of C (q), and the likelihood ratio (1 ¡´1)=(1 ¡´0), which measures the signi…cance of the signal for the value of t 1 . If this ratio is too high, the signal means too little, and the optimal strategy never conditions on the signal. High ! means that the prior probability of t 1 = 3 is high. Even if 2 receives a ¦, if ! is high enough, it remains probable enough that 1 is participating to make C by each best for M. So high ! also militates for C-by-both-regardlessof-signal, i.e. for (C;CC), and low enough q=w makes (C;CC) best. At the other extreme, if q=w is high enough, (D, DD) is best. Even if´1 is virtually 1 and´0 virtually zero, so that if 2 does get an ? he is virtually certain that 1 is participating, if q=w is great enough it is better for M that 1 choose D and 2 choose D even after ?. One reason is the loss from 1's playing C when 2 is not participating (and so plays D), which is great if q=w is high. If, however, the signal is signi…cant enough, there is an intermediate interval of values of q=w in which what is best for M depends on the signal. By putting (1 ¡´1)=(1 ¡´0) = 1 we get the equilibrium for a simple PD with unreliable utilitarian team reasoning given by Theorem 1.
Social Dilemmas with Several Group Identities
In this section I consider a nonelementary uti. I ask how the willingness to contribute to a public good is a¤ected by group identi…cation, and specifically how it is a¤ected if di¤erent agents tend to identify with di¤erent subgroups. This team structure allows us to use the uti model to study hostility in 'in-groups' towards 'out-groups'. The basic public good problem I consider is as follows. Each of N agents is endowed with 10 units of a good G, and chooses to take an amount x i of it (0 6 x i 6 10). Write c i = 10 ¡x i for i's contribution. The growth factor is g: that is, if the total contribution is C = P N i=1 c i , the supply of G in the next period is gC. The period 2 supply is shared out equally. Individuals care only about consumption -the sum of what they take and their period 2 share -and do so linearly.
As a preliminary, consider a team M of m members (m 6 N), which has the objective function U = P i2M x i + m N gC. Suppose the team protocol is for each active member to take x, and that each agent i not active in M, whether a member of M or not, takes some default amount d i . Assume the team is perfectly reliable. Then the payo¤ from this protocol is
and
which > 0 if and only if m > N=g. Thus the optimal (symmetric) protocol is (0; ¢ ¢ ¢ ; 0) or (10; ¢ ¢ ¢ ; 10) according as m is or is not [10] less than the critical size N=g, independently of what outsiders do. Of course, if outsiders take little, U will be greater; but this has no e¤ect on the marginal group product of group restraint. So far, the only conclusion that can safely be drawn is that group identi…cation makes a di¤erence if and only if the group is large enough. The starkness of the di¤erence made, the critical size of the group, and the independence of this size of what outsiders do, are artefacts of implausible simpli…cations. For example, once we make the production function concave (in the manner of Walker, Gardner and Olstrom 1990), the critical value of m increases with the total contribution of outsiders. And if we let the team be 'conditional utilitarian' -U increases with the welfare only of those actually motivated by U, i.e. the active members -this reduces the critical size. On the other hand, the conclusions are robust to some relaxations of the assumptions. In particular, although we might expect unreliability to increase the critical size of the team, it does not. These variants are described in . Suppose now that there are two teams, which partition the agent into subsets M k of size m k (k = 1; 2). Then the condition for a team to contribute something is as before: m k > N=g. This remains true even if team memberships overlap, as long as the teams are unconditional teamutilitarian: that is, if i belongs to M 1 then, even if she lapses, and even if she is active in the other team, her consumption enters M 1 's objective.
For, if each member of M 1 takes x 1 under M 1 's protocol, the linearity of M 1 's objective U 1 in x 1 still means that the sign of @U 1 =@x 1 is independent of the consumption of all i = 2 M 1 . The same holds for the unreliable case, with EU replacing U. Thus we have: In the linear public good problem with unreliable team-utilitarian teams, agent i contributes if and only if she is active in some team of size > N=g. Kramer and Brewer 1984 found that in a simulated 'commons dilemma', the tendency to contribute fell when subordinate group identities were made salient. This might be explicable simply by size e¤ects. But it is has been recognized since the Robbers Cave experiment (Sherif et al 1961) that di¤erential categorization tends to produce positive ill-will towards members of the 'out-group'. Let us use the uti model to see how antipathy towards a second group might militate against restraint.
Suppose M 1 , M 2 partition the player set f1; ¢ ¢ ¢ ; Ng. Assume that
If h = 0 (no antipathy), critical m k is N=g as before. If h = 1, so the outgroup's loss weighs as much as own group's gain, critical m k = 0:5(N=g) + 0:5N. With the parameter values N = 20; g = 3, an h value of 0:25 raises critical m k from 6:67 to 10.
DISCUSSION
Two questions need to be sharply distinguished: "Given that someone team reasons for M, to what choice does this lead her?" "Can it be rational to team reason for M?" For most of this paper I have focussed on the …rst of these questions. I turn brie ‡y to the second. Team reasoning can seem at …rst blush to be irrational, even absurd. But this may simply be an e¤ect of prejudice on our part in favour of a normative paradigm of practical reasoning deeply embedded and lauded in our culture: individual reasoning. Team reasoning is not clearly irrational. To see this, consider ordinary forward-looking 'prudential' reasoning by a person. In this commonest of all modes of practical reasoning, at time t the part of the (time-extended) person which is at t is led to execute her part in a pro…le computed to maximize the bene…t of the time-extended self. Likewise, in 'we' reasoning, the part of the (collective) self at me is led to execute her part in a pro…le computed to maximize the bene…t of the collective self! Sugden (1993) argues that if there is common knowledge that 1 and 2 are both team reasoning, it is rational to team reason. The rationality lies, Sugden suggests, in the bene…ts that will accrue to all the individuals in the team. But then we can go further; we don't need the common knowledge condition, only circumspection. Even when ! < 1 (and a fortiori there isn't common knowledge), members of M can in many important types of problem bene…t from team reasoning. Consider the PD: by Theorem 4, as long as w > 2q=(1 ¡ q), both get c instead of r (e.g. if c = 3, r = 1, m = 0:5, q = 0:2 as in the Section 3 example, we only need w > 0:5 or ! > 0:333. Hence, team reasoning of the kind I have described would have been adaptive in a world of interactions with these …tness payo¤s, one individualist genotype and a modest frequency of team reasoners.
This raises the question of how team reasoning in PD-like games is related to so-called 'conditional cooperation' (Gauthier 1986 , Campbell 1988 , Howard 1988 , Smith 1991 , Danielson 1992 ). This is a large question on which I can not expatiate. But one or two points may help clarify things. An agent may be a conditional cooperator in di¤erent senses. Firstly, the conditioned variable may be either her choice, or her method for determining a choice; likewise the conditioning variable may be either a choice or a method. Secondly, the information about the conditioner may be either personal, or impersonal (population) information. In Gauthier, a conditional cooperator has a …xed method and it involves conditioning her choice on personal information about (on the standard reading of Gauthier) choice. Campbell, Howard and Danielson propose a conditional cooperator (a 'selfsame cooperator') who has a …xed method which conditions her choice on personal information about method. The theory of cooperation I have been sketching is like these in de…ning the method by a choice-on-method conditional. But there are two salient di¤erences: …rst, in my theory the method is a general one, team reasoning, while in these proposals it is a heuristic de…ned for a special game, the PD. Second, the information may be either personal (as in the PD with partial communication) or not (as in the simple incomunicado games of Section 3).
The unreliable team explanation of cooperative behaviour I have outlined in this paper contains an important lacuna. The distribution of agents over teams, and the probabilities that they are active, are exogenous. Say that according to the unreliable team theory an agent cooperates in a game G just if she is active in a team M and the probability ! of this exceeds some critical value. Then the explanation of an observed cooperation rate of°in G is incomplete until we can explain why the probability of team reasoning ! should approximate°. In particular, suppose the game is Hi-Lo, in which we observe a cooperation rate of almost 1; then we must explain why team reasoning should occur with probability almost 1.
To endogenize !, and other features of -, one must show that the payo¤s and other constitutive features of the basic game make collective identity salient or otherwise tend to induce team-thinking. The laboratory evidence is promising, as it suggests that group identi…cation may be induced by the 'common problem mechanism'. In addition, it is plausible that ! may be an increasing function of certain quantitative features of the payo¤ structure, such as 'scope for cooperation' and 'harmony of interests' (Bacharach 1997) .
The primary aim of this paper has been to elucidate what 'team reasoning' is, to describe it in a clear, formal way, imposing the requirement that it be 'circumspect', and to describe the outcomes of interactions between individuals who team reason with given probabilities. I have also suggested that the model can be used to spell out the hypothesis, advanced in experimental psychology, that cooperative behaviour may be produced by 'group identi…cation'. I have stressed that team reasoning di¤ers from, and is more powerful than, adopting the group's objective and then reasoning in the standard individualistic way. The fundamental source of this power is that individuals who team reason assume a common, higher standpoint.
I conjecture that it is true, and hope that it may prove possible to demonstrate, that this form of reasoning is the only possible way in which unbounded reasoners can be led to choose in accordance with the Pareto Dominance principle. But just the same reasoning also yields cooperation in cases in which our intuitions for cooperation are much more tentative, and even in the one-shot Dilemma. So demonstrating the conjecture would open a new chapter in showing reason for cooperation even in the hardest cases.
FOOTNOTES
1. I take this terminology from multi-agent system theory; the corresponding terms in the theory of teams are 'decision function' and 'team decision function'.
2. Most writers on collective reasoning in games (Hurley 1989 , Sugden 1993 , Cookson 1997 ) have con…ned themselves to the case in which there is scope for cooperation, the only plural team is the player set, and its objective is Paretian.
3. Knauft (1989) suggests that the cooperativeness observed in experiments in which Dawes et al (1989) primed a sense of group identity may be due to a "latter day extension of biogenetic in-group interest to ever more inclusive categories of people who assess themselves as having a common identity".
4. Brewer and Gardner (1996) suggest that a person has three radically ways of thinking of herself : as a 'personal self', a 'relational self' and a 'collective self'. Some psychologists go further than this. 'Social identity theorists' such as Tajfel and Turner (1985) , claim that the sense of group identity precedes the sense of personal identity ontogenetically: for a developing human, the 'I' is partly de…ned by the 'us'.
5. There is ample casual evidence that people slip quite easily from a personal self-identity to a collective one, and indeed from one collective identity to another (such as private citizen, department member, Briton, European): most individuals have multiple social identities and category memberships. The ease which which we change collectivity hats may be explained by a capacity which evolved to produce solidarity with the permanent living group without the co-evolution of a capacity to discriminate one surrounding group from another.
6. Arguably, cooperation in some important sense entails participation in a team plan (Bicchieri 1990 , Tuomela 1995 . Here, I shall allow that cooperating is not conceptually tied to team reasoning, and argue only that an important way in which scope for cooperation is realized empirically may be: group identi…cation!team reasoning!C-choices.
7. Hi-Lo presents a sharp puzzle: why is it so obviously rational to play H, yet not provable in game theory that H will be played? Sugden (1993) uses a similar game (the 'Prisoners' Coordination Problem') to illustrate his argument that 'thinking as a team' can be rationally justi…ed. Colman and Bacharach (1997) take a di¤erent tack, suggesting a compelling but dubiously rational heuristic which might lead players to play H in Hi-Lo.
8. Provided that, as is generically the case, the maximizing protocol is unique.
9. The maximum regret, or 'risk', for M of a C choice by either member is r ¡ m (e.g. if 1 plays C, then M misses out on r ¡ m if 2 plays D), and the maximum regret of a D choice for M is c ¡ m. Thus q = (r ¡ m)=(c ¡ m) is the 'relative risk' of C: if q is low the error of wrongly playing C is relatively uncostly.
10. For simplicity I assume that the protocol is to contribute in breakeven cases. 
APPENDIX
